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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue No. L Did the trial court correctly rule as a matter of law that Utah Code
Ann. § 14-2-2(1), which imposes liability on a project owner for failure to obtain a
payment bond, anticipates and includes liability for rental equipment?
Standard of Review. Courts of appeal review "grants of summary judgments under
the 'correctness' standard

" Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App.

1995) (citing Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196
(Utah Ct. App. 1992)).
Issue No. 2. Did the trial court correctly rule as a matter of law that the measure of
damages under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(1) for failure to obtain a payment bond is the
market value of the equipment supplied, not the value actually received by the owner?
Standard of Review. The same correction-of-error standard of review that governs
Issue No. 1 applies.
Issue No. 3. Did the trial court correctly act within its broad discretion in awarding
T.S.S. its attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3)?
Standard of Review. Courts of appeal review a trial court's decision to award or
deny attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) for an abuse of discretion.
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[SJection
1

14-2-2(3) endows the trial court with discretion in awarding attorney fees. We must
therefore determine whether the trial court's denial of those fees constituted an abuse of
discretion.")
Issue No. 4. Did the trial court correctly rule as a matter of law that T.S.S. was
entitled to recover interest on its judgment against Saratoga at the contract rate of 18%?
Standard of Review. The same correction-of-error standard of review that governs
Issue No. 1 applies.
GOVERNING LAW
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are of central importance to
the outcome of this appeal: Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 (collectively referred
to as the "Payment Bond Statutes"). Saratoga sets forth the relevant text of § 14-2-2 in its
brief. It does not, however, set forth the relevant text of § 14-2-1. It is as follows:
14-2-1. Definitions - Payment bond required - Right of action - Notice Attorneys' fees.
(1) For purposes of this chapter:
sje

ijc

s|c

sje sjc

(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for construction,
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon
land.
(2)
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), before any
contract exceeding $2,000 in amount for the construction, alteration,
or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land is
awarded to any contractor, the owner shall obtain from the contractor
a payment bond complying with Subsection (3).

The amount of the contract between Saratoga and Larry Price Construction exceeded
$2,000.00. (R. at 89, ^j 3.) Saratoga failed, however, to obtain a payment bond from
Larry Price Construction, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1. (R. at 89, ^ 4.)
Larry Price Construction hired Freewheeling Enterprises, Inc. ("Freewheeling") to
do some of the work on the sewer system. (R. at 89, ^f 5.) To perform that work,
Freewheeling rented equipment from T.S.S. and gave T.S.S. a check for $3,392.57 to be
applied toward the rental. (R. at 88, f 6.) T.S.S. delivered the equipment to the project
site. (R. at 88, ^ 6.)
Eventually the $3,392.57 Freewheeling had given to T.S.S. to be applied toward
the rental was consumed. Consequently, Freewheeling continued to rent the equipment
from T.S.S. on credit. (R. at 88, ^ 7.) The credit agreement between T.S.S. and
Freewheeling provided for interest at the annual rate of 18%. (R. at 87, ^ 11.) It also
stated T.S.S. would be entitled to recover all costs and attorneys fees incurred in
collecting any amounts owed. (R. at 87, ^f 12.)
On September 24, 1999, Freewheeling's check for $3,392.57 was returned for
nonsufficient funds. (R. at 88, f 9.) T.S.S. reacquired the equipment the next day. T.S.S.
never secured any money from Freewheeling against the amount owed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Payment Bond Statutes impose liability on individuals and entities for failing
to obtain a payment bond on construction projects where the total of the work exceeds
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(3) The payment bond shall be . . . for the protection of all persons
supplying labor, services, equipment, or material in the prosecution of the
work provided for in the contract in a sum equal to the contract price.
The Payment Bond Statutes are attached in their entirety as Addendum A to Saratoga's
brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

T.S.S. agrees with Saratoga's recitation of the nature of the case, course of
proceedings and disposition below.
B.

Statement of Facts.

T.S.S. does not disagree with any of the facts stated in Saratoga's Brief. However,
Saratoga has failed to marshal the evidence to include all facts supporting the trial court's
ruling. Those additional facts are as follows:
At all relevant times, Saratoga owned several lots within a planned unit
development known as Saratoga Springs. (R. at 89, ^f 1.) The Town of Saratoga Springs
would not agree to approve certain subdivision plats until specific improvements were
made to the sewer system servicing the subdivision. Consequently, Saratoga hired
general contractor Larry Price Construction to make those improvements. (R. at 89, *f[ 2.)

1

Saratoga's failure to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's rulings is
grounds alone for affirming each of those rulings.
3

$2,000. Nowhere do those statutes exclude liability for equipment that is rented. In fact
case law interpreting the nearly identical federal payment bond statutes routinely hold that
only rental equipment is protected. Moreover, the legislative history and express purpose
of the Payment Bond Statutes demonstrate the Legislature intended rental equipment to
be included within the protections of the Payment Bond Statutes. There is nothing in the
language or history of the Payment Bond Statues which requires the owner to receive an
actual benefit from the equipment used.
The express language of the Payment Bond Statutes sets the amount of liability for
failure to obtain a payment bond as the reasonable value of the equipment supplied. The
value of the equipment includes not only the principal amount due for the rental but the
interest charged as well. It also includes potential liability for attorneys' fees. While the
statute addressing failure to obtain a payment bond gives the court discretion to award
attorneys' fees, there is nothing in its language that requires any culpability beyond failure
to obtain the bond.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT $ 14-2-2(1) IMPOSES LIABILITY FOR RENTAL EQUIPMENT.

Utah Code Section 14-2-2 states, "[A]n owner who fails to obtain a payment bond
is liable to each person who . . . supplied equipment... for the reasonable value of...
the equipment.. . furnished . . .." Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(1). The trial court ruled as a
matter of law that Saratoga was liable to T.S.S. under this section for the value of the
5

equipment T.S.S. rented to Freewheeling. Saratoga argues the trial court erroneously
concluded § 14-2-2(1) imposes liability for rental equipment both under the plain
meaning of the statute and based on its legislative history. (Saratoga's Brief, pg. 5.)
Saratoga is wrong on both points.
A.

Plain Meaning of the Statute.

Saratoga argues the term "furnished" in § 14-2-2(1) excludes coverage for
equipment that is rented. (Saratoga's Brief, pg. 6.) It cites no support from any source statutory, case law or other - supporting its interpretation of the word "furnished."
There are only two types of equipment that can be supplied or furnished for use on
a construction project: equipment that is owned and equipment that is rented. Section
14-2-2(1) makes no distinction between the two. Thomas Jefferson once said, "Laws are
made for men of ordinary understanding, and should therefore, be construed by the
ordinary rules of common sense. Their meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical
subtleties, which may make anything mean everything or nothing at pleasure." Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, June 12, 1823. Common sense dictates that
liability for "equipment... furnished" refers to all equipment provided for use on the
project, which includes rental equipment. The trial court's ruling should, therefore, be
affirmed on this ground.

6

B.

Legislative History.

The legislative history of § 14-2-2 also supports the trial court's determination that
it includes liability for rental equipment.
1.

Historical Amendments.

Prior to 1985, § 14-2-1, which provides the context for § 14-2-2, extended
protection only for "material furnished and labor performed under the contract." S.B. 15,
Forty-Sixth Legis. Sess. (Utah 1985) (attached to Saratoga's Brief as Addendum C.) In
1985, the Legislature amended the statute to specifically include rented equipment. Id.
(attached to Saratoga's Brief as Addendum C.) The bill's sponsor stated during a floor
debate that the purpose of the amendment was to bring the bond law into conformity with
the mechanic's lien law and to allow recovery for rental equipment. Legis. Rec, January
21, 1985 (statement of Sen. Carling). It had the additional effect of bringing the statutory
language in line with the long-standing interpretation of "labor and material" under the
mother of all modern payment bond statutes, the federal Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270a, et
seq. ("Miller Act") and other comparable statutes.
The Legislature amended § 14-2-1 again in 1987. The purpose of the amendment
was to make the Payment Bond Statutes consistent with the recently-enacted procurement
code applicable originally to state procurement. Legis. Rec, February 20, 1987
(statement of Sen. Carling). In Senator Carling's own words, the 1987 amendment made
"no substantive changes" to the statute but was merely a "recodification" or "reenactment
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of the current law." Id. However, the 1987 amendment, mistakenly excluded all specific
references to equipment and referred only to "material furnished and labor supplied."
S.B. 183, Forty-Seventh Legis. Sess. (Utah 1987) (attached to Saratoga's Brief as
Addendum D.) Realizing the confusion potentially resulting from the omission, the
Legislature further amended the statute in 1989 to again to make clear that those
furnishing equipment on a project had rights to claim and recover on the statutory
payment bonds. S.B. 198, Forty-Eighth Legis. Sess. (Utah 1989) (attached to Saratoga's
Brief as Addendum E.)
2.

Application of the Federal Miller Act.

There are no reported cases addressing whether the current version of § 14-2-2
imposes liability for rental equipment. However, it would defy decades of interpretation
and application of similar statutes to suggest that the section's reference to "equipment"
was intended to be to other than rental equipment or - more illogical still - to bar claims
for rental equipment. Early versions of Utah's payment bond statutes, governing both
public and private projects, were modeled almost verbatim after the Miller Act, to the
point that they are referred to as Utah's "Little Miller Act." See Utah Legislative Survey,
1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 127 n.79; Cox Rock Prod v. Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d
672, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah Courts have in fact turned to the federal statute at
times to interpret similar provisions in the Utah payment bond statutes. For example, the
Utah Supreme Court interpreted the notice provisions of § 14-1-6 in a 1970 case and
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"subscribed to the principles and cases" cited in a federal case involving "the similar
Miller Act." A.A. Maycock, Inc. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 24 Utah 2d 369, 371-72,
472 P.2d 424, 426 (1970).
The Miller Act has never expressly referred to "equipment" as an element of either
"labor or material" for which a bond claim might be had by an unpaid subcontractor or
supplier. It is well settled, nonetheless, that equipment rental (as opposed to capital
expenditures for equipment purchases) is within the scope of "material" under the Miller
Act. The Tenth Circuit has expressly ruled that equipment used on a project that is not
rental equipment (i.e., owned by the user) does not fall within the protections of the
Miller Act. However, rental equipment does. It explained, "[A] purchase of such
equipment is not covered because the seller is not supplying materials to be consumed on
the bonded project." U.S. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 634 F.2d at 1050 (citing Continental Casualty
Co. v. Clarence L. Boyd Co., 140 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1944)). However, "[A] fair rental
charge for the use of [] equipment... is within the purview of the Miller Act bond
because the value of the lease payment is substantially consumed in the project." Id. at
1052.
3.

Historical Interpretation of Payment Bond Statutes.

Utah's Payment Bond Statutes, otherwise referred to as Utah's Little Miller Act,
have undergone several structural revisions since 1963. As Saratoga has observed, some
of those revisions have apparently confused the issue of whether or not "equipment" is
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within the scope of "labor or material" - this despite decades of interpretation of
comparable statutes in favor of including equipment. Saratoga's argument that Utah's
Legislature did not intend to include rental equipment within the protections of the
Payment Bond Statutes because it amended them in 1985 to include rental equipment but
replaced that provision in 1987 with a version that referred generally only to "equipment,"
without any reference to "rental" is both illogical and misleading. At a minimum,
Saratoga unnecessarily confuses the legislative history in favor of unwarranted and
overly-narrow conclusions.
Nowhere in Utah's relevant case law (including the cases upon which Saratoga
relies) or in the history of the payment bond legislation is there any suggestion that, when
equipment is covered, it refers to equipment purchased in connection with a subcontract,
as opposed to equipment rented by a contractor. The logic of the Miller Act cases cited
above and providing coverage for rental equipment only remains as sound as ever.
Saratoga cites Johnson v. Gallegos Const Co., 785 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1990) and
Graco Fishing v. Ironwood Exploration, 766 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1988) as support for its
argument that the Legislature did not intend to include rental equipment within the
protections of the payment bond statutes. Neither case supports the proffered conclusion,
however. In fact, both cases involve interpretation and application of statutory payment
bond provisions that failed in the versions then applicable to specifically acknowledge
claims for "equipment" as part of "labor or materials."

10

The plaintiffs in Johnson rented equipment to a subcontractor on a state project.
Johnson, 785 P.2d at 1110. The subcontractor failed to pay for the rentals and the
plaintiffs sued on the payment bond to recover the reasonable rental value of the
equipment. The issue before the court in Johnson was whether equipment rental charges
were within the scope of the phrase 'labor or materiar under the payment bond
provisions of the Utah Procurement Code, Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38, et seq. Id.
Relying on the absence of any reference to "equipment" under the payment bond
provisions, the court concluded "the term iabor and material' as used in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-56-38 did not include rent for equipment." Id. at 1112.
The plaintiff in Graco rented equipment to a subcontractor on a private project.
Graco, 766 P.2d at 1075-76. The subcontractor failed to pay for the rental and the
plaintiff sued the owner of the project for failure to obtain a payment bond, as required by
§ 14-2-1. At that time, § 14-2-2 stated, "'Any person . . . who shall fail to obtain such
good and sufficient bond . . . shall be personally liable to all persons who have furnished
materials or performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials
furnished or labor performed . . . . ' " Id. at 1078 (second alteration in original). While the
statute was subsequently amended to include charges for equipment, it made no specific
mention of equipment at the time the claims arose. Id. at 1079. The court therefore
concluded the owner was not liable for the equipment rental. Id.
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Johnson and Graco are clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case because
the statutes in place at the time of those cases made no reference whatsoever to
equipment, and the courts were unwilling to expand to equipment the protection afforded
for labor and materials. By contrast, the version of the statute applicable in this case
expressly permits recovery for "the reasonable value of... equipment... furnished . . . . "
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(1). Consequently, neither Johnson nor Graco have any bearing
on this case, other than in Graco"s recognition of a broader principle that actually
supports T.S.S.'s position. As the Graco court stated, "[0]ur statutes are to be liberally
construed to give effect to their purpose and to promote justice . . . ." Graco, 766 P.2d at
1079. The court continued:
In order to impose upon [a property owner] such additional burdens
[beyond what he contracted to bear for the improvement of his property] the
law must clearly spell out the responsibility. Otherwise, the entering into a
contract for the improvement of one's property might open the door to
unforeseeable risks for the property owner. He is aware of the amount of
work to be done upon his property and fairly may be charged with
knowledge of the extent thereof.
Id. At the time Saratoga contracted for the improvements at issue, the Payment Bond
Statutes expressly required it, as the entity contracting for the work to be done, to obtain a
payment bond "for the protection of all persons supplying . . . equipment..." Utah Code
Ann. § 14-2-1(3). The consequence of failure to honor this statutory requirement is direct
liability "to each person . . . who supplied equipment... for the reasonable value of...
the equipment. . . furnished up to but not exceeding the contract price." The Legislature

12

clearly declared that by failing to provide a payment bond, Saratoga could be held liable
for unpaid rental equipment. Saratoga cannot, therefore, argue the risk was unforeseeable
or that it should not be charged with the knowledge it might be held liable.
Saratoga also cites Western Coating, Inc. v. Gibbons & Reed, 788 P.2d 503 (Utah
1990), as support for its argument. Saratoga argues the Utah Legislature consciously
amended the Payment Bond Statute to eliminate coverage for rental equipment and cites
Western Coating for that assertion. (Saratoga's Brief, pg. 9.) In fact, there is no support
in Western Coating for the "conscious amendment" conclusion. The "sole issue" in
Western Coating was "whether third-tier suppliers are covered by the then-applicable
version of the Utah Procurement Code." Id. at 503. In addressing that issue, the Court
gave significant deference to interpretation of the Miller Act denying such coverage. The
court did note in dicta that "the absence of language [in the payment bond provisions of
the Procurement Code] covering rental of equipment manifested an intent by the
legislature not to include such rental." Id. at 504. However, as with the other cases cited
by Saratoga, the version of the payment bond provisions applicable in that case was a
version referring only to claims for "labor or material." There is nothing whatsoever in
the case indicating the Legislature ever eliminated coverage for rental equipment from the
Payment Bond Statutes.

13

4.

Remaining Arguments.

To avoid the problems associated with these cases, Saratoga argues the Utah
mechanics' lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3, which extends the right to file a lien to
those "furnishing or renting any materials or equipment," demonstrates the Legislature
intended to exclude rental equipment from the Payment Bond Statutes since it used the
term "renting" in § 38-1-3 but not the Payment Bond Statutes. (Saratoga's Brief, pgs. 1011.) However, it offers no support for that argument, which is illogical in light of the
legislative history of the Payment Bond Statutes and cases addressing them. The intent of
the Legislature, from the legislative history explained above, demonstrates an intent to
include rental equipment, not exclude it.
Saratoga also argues as support for this point that a company that rents equipment
for which it is not paid bears a much lower risk than a company that sells equipment for
use on a project because the rental company will obtain the return of its equipment and
can later rent it to other customers whereas a company that sells the equipment will lose
the entire value of the equipment if not paid. (Saratoga's Brief, pgs. 11-12.) This
argument is faulty for two reasons. First, Saratoga did not raise it below and, therefore,
waived it for purposes of this appeal. Second, the argument fails to recognize that if not
allowed to recover under the Payment Bond Statutes, the rental company is out the
amount it is entitled to for rent and cannot later recover it. The purchasing company,
however, could repossess equipment sold for use on a project. Anything incorporated

14

into the project which could not be repossessed, such a the lumber mentioned in
Saratoga's brief, is not equipment but materials, which are provided for in the statute.
The plain language of § 14-2-2 as well as its legislative history demonstrate it
imposes liability for rental equipment. The trial court's ruling on this issue should
therefore be affirmed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT § 14-2-2(1) DOES NOT REQUIRE SARATOGA TO RECEIVE A
BENEFIT AS A PREREQUISITE TO ITS LIABILITY.

Saratoga argues that imposing liability on it under the facts of this case would not
be consistent with the purpose behind the Payment Bond Statutes because the Payment
Bond Statutes were enacted to ensure that the risk of loss for failure to obtain a payment
bond is borne by the person or entity for whose benefit the underlying improvement was
made. Saratoga asserts it received no "benefit" because the subcontractor that rented the
equipment from T.S.S. failed to properly perform its work, which Saratoga claims it then
removed and replaced. There is no assertion that T.S.S. was somehow involved in or
responsible for the allegedly faulty work. Nonetheless, Saratoga claims allowing T.S.S.
to recover the reasonable value of the rental equipment would defeat the purpose of the
Payment Bond Statutes.
The primary purpose of the Payment Bond Statutes, and the one expressly
enumerated by the Legislature, is "for the protection of all persons supplying . . .
equipment... in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract in a sum equal
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to the contract price." Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1(3). The Wagner case, which Saratoga
cites in support of its argument, is consistent. It states, "'[T]hese statutes should be
interpreted and applied in such a manner as to carry out the purpose for which they were
created: to protect those who supply labor and materials."' John Wagner Associates v.
Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting King Bros.} Inc. v. Utah Dry
Kiln Co., 440 P.2d 17, 18 (Utah 1968)) (alteration in original). With the 1989 amendment
to § 14-2-1, the purpose is also to protect those supplying equipment. The court in
Wagner went on to state:
If the owner requires the contractor to procure the statutory bond, he is
protected against loss. If he does not, he becomes liable to laborers and
materialmen if the contractor fails to pay them, even though he may have
paid the contractor in full. He has his remedy in his own hands.
Id. at 1126 (quoting Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 167 P. 241, 244, 46 (1917))
(emphasis omitted).
The focus of the statute is to shift the risk of loss to the one in the best position to
ensure compliance. The owner can choose either to obtain a payment bond or assume the
risk of having to pay twice. The owner, as the "employer" of everyone on the project is,
after all, in the best position to ensure compliance. At the very least, he is certainly in a
better position than the remote equipment supplier. That is why the Legislature shifted
the burden to him.
Saratoga argues that the phrase "reasonable value of the . . . equipment...
furnished" contemplates some type of value to the owner. It cites no authority
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whatsoever - statutory, case law, legislative history or otherwise - for its position. Its
interpretation is contrary to the common sense meaning of the statute, which contemplates
the supplier of the equipment is to be compensated for the value of it to the supplier.
Here, that is the rental amount. In a further attempt to attack, it argues for the first time
on appeal that T.S.S. "could not establish any value by which the court could measure
reimbursement that could possibly be due TSS." (Saratoga's Brief, pg. 17.) The
evidence is to the contrary. The record details the principal amount of the rental charges
and the interest due and the rate at which the interest was calculated. (R. at 87-88, Ifij 1011.) Saratoga never objected in any way to these calculations below.
Saratoga makes two additional arguments on this point in passing footnotes. First,
it argues T.S.S. was a supplier to a subcontractor on the project and it is unclear that the
Payment Bond Statutes permit it to recover as a sub-subcontractor. (Saratoga's Brief, pg.
17 n.9.) This argument is contrary to the language and purpose of the Payment Bond
Statutes. Section 14-2-1 states the payment bond is required "for the protection of all
persons supplying labor, services, equipment, or material in the prosecution of the work
provided for in the contract...." The only limitation on how far this protection extends
is that the labor, materials or equipment be supplied for use on the project. There was no
dispute below that the equipment was used on Saratoga's project.

2

Second, Saratoga

Saratoga states on pg.13 footnote 6 of its brief that there is no assurance the
T.S.S. equipment was used on its project. However, it failed to raise this point below and
has, therefore, waived it for purposes of this appeal.
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argues T.S.S. never provided a notice of claim "to the contractor." (Saratoga's Brief, pgs.
17-18 n.9.) There is no evidence in the record supporting this assertion. Consequently, it
cannot be considered on appeal.
Saratoga had the statutory burden of obtaining a payment bond. It failed to satisfy
that burden. Consequently, it should bear the responsibility of failing to meet its statutory
duties, not T.S.S. The trial court's ruling should thus be affirmed on this issue.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ACTED WITHIN ITS BROAD
DISCRETION IN AWARDING T.S.S. ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. $ 14-2-2(3).

Section 14-2-2(3), authorizes an award of attorneys' fees to a party who prevails
on a claim for failure to obtain a payment bond. The section specifically provides, "In an
action for failure to obtain a bond, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party." It is clear from the language of the statute that courts have discretion to
award fees under that section. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994). An award or denial of fees requested under that section by a prevailing
party is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 428.
A.

Cases Interpreting the Payment Bond Statutes.

Bailey-Allen is the only reported case addressing in any context a request for
attorneys' fees under the provisions of the Payment Bond Statutes. The trial court in
Bailey-Allen granted partial summary judgment dismissing the general contractor's claims
against the defendants/owners under the mechanics lien statutes and for their failure to
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require a payment bond, but denied their request for fees without explanation. The Utah
Court of Appeals recognized that an award of fees under the statute was discretionary and
that a review of the denial was to be conducted under the abuse of discretion standard.
Because the trial court failed to explain its denial, however, there were no findings of fact
on which to conduct a review. The court stated, "[I]n order for this court to conduct a
meaningful review of that determination [to deny fees under the statute], we must rely on
adequate findings of fact which are absent in this case." Id. at 428 (internal citation
omitted). The Court of Appeals therefore remanded the case to the trial court for further
findings on its denial of the requested fees. It also provided additional guidance to the
trial court in making its decision stating, "When determining whether attorney fees should
be awarded under the Bond Statute, the trial court should consider precedent treating the
Bond Statute as auxiliary to the Mechanics' Lien Statute and as sharing with it a common
purpose." Id. On remand, the trial court awarded fees to the plaintiffs, as the prevailing
parties on the Bond and Mechanics' Lien claims. See Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet,
945 P.2d 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
The court in John Wagner Associates v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), addressed the purposes of the Mechanics' Lien and Payment Bond Statutes
together. It stated:
The aim and purpose of our mechanic's lien law manifestly has been
to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and furnish the
materials which enter into the construction of a building or other
improvement. The result has been that the owner of the premises, at whose
19

instance and for whose benefit the improvement is made, has been the one
most likely to suffer loss. He pays at his peril the original contractor, who
generally needs it and demands it as the work progresses.
If he does not reserve enough of the fund in his own hands to pay for
the labor of subcontractors and employees, and the price of materials, he
incurs the risk of having to pay over again for at least a part of these items.
The bond, as in this case[,] is conditioned for the faithful
performance of the contract and securing the payment of the laborers and
materialmen. If the owner requires the contractor to procure the statutory
bond, he is protected against loss. If he does not, he becomes liable to
laborers and materialmen if the contractor fails to pay them, even though
he may have paid the contractor in full. He has his remedy in his own
hands.
Id at 1125 (quoting Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 167 P. 241, 244, 246 (1917)
(emphases added, emphases in original omitted, alterations in original).
The purposes of the Mechanic's Lien and the broader Payment Bond Statutes,
applicable to both public and private projects and examined in conjunction with the facts
of this case, support an award to T.S.S. of the attorneys fees incurred in pursuing and
collecting its judgment against Saratoga. Saratoga was statutorily required to obtain a
payment bond for the project for the benefit of unpaid suppliers and subcontractors. For
whatever reason, it failed to do so, and, by statute, was thus exposed to the risk of direct
liability to unpaid suppliers and subcontractors. Even in the absence of a payment bond,
Saratoga could have protected itself by withholding from its contractor the amount of
money earmarked for payment to all subcontractors.
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B.

Purpose of the Payment Bond Statutes.

The context in which the Payment Bond Statute operates demonstrates an inherent
presumption that attorneys' fees should generally be awarded in cases involving claims by
unpaid suppliers and subcontractors. Had Saratoga furnished a payment bond, as it was
statutorily required to do, T.S.S. would have had rights against the bond, under § 14-2-1.
Had T.S.S. prevailed on that claim, as it did here, it would have been entitled to attorneys'
fees by statute. Section 14-2-1(7) provides that the court "shall award reasonable
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party" in such an action. Court discretion in that instance
would be limited to a determination of a reasonable fee. Moreover, had T.S.S. pursued
and prevailed on a mechanics' lien claim, it would likewise have been entitled to its fees.
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18.
Only in extraordinary circumstances should the result be different when the claim
is against the owner for its failure to require or obtain a payment bond from its
contractors. Examples of such instances might be the following: 1) when a claim for
failure to obtain a payment bond is expeditiously and promptly resolved without the need
for litigation or substantial attorney involvement but where fees are nevertheless
generated; 2) when a payment bond claim succeeds in conjunction with a mechanics' lien
foreclosure action, since an award of fees on the foreclosure claim is mandatory and the
payment bond claim might be duplicative; 3) where the supplier or laborer may combine
an action against the owner with a contract claim against the person or entity who
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contracted for the goods or services but failed to pay for them and ultimately collects
from that entity; or 4) when a supplier files a good-faith claim against an owner for failure
to obtain a payment bond but does not prevail because of a technical difficulty and the
owner seeks fees as the prevailing party.
This case offers none of the suggested circumstances, nor any other facts which
might militate against an award of fees. In fact, T.S.S. was forced into litigation to
preserve and enforce its rights and only by recovering its fees will T.S.S. come close to
being made whole for the failure of payment in this case. The specific facts of this case
further demonstrate why an award of fees is so important. The principal balance owed for
equipment T.S.S. supplied to the Project was just greater than $3,800.00. The fees T.S.S.
incurred in obtaining its judgment was slightly more than twice the principal balance. If
there were no possibility that T.S.S. might be awarded its attorneys' fees in pursuing its
statutory right to payment from Saratoga, T.S.S. likely would have been left to conclude
the costs of pursuing those rights outweighed the benefits and, therefore, declined to
pursue the amounts owed. This could have potentially devastating effects on not only
T.S.S. but on the industry as a whole, licensing owners who have failed to provide for the
bond protection required by statute to effectively thumb their nose at claimants unwilling
to undertake the cost of pursuing valid claims. That is precisely the reason the
Legislature made payment bonds mandatory instead of permissive.
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There has never been any dispute that the decision whether to award attorneys'
fees under 14-2-2(3) is discretionary. Based on these facts as applied to controlling case
law, the district court judge properly exercised his discretion in awarding T.S.S. its
attorneys' fees incurred in obtaining the judgment against Saratoga as well as those
incurred in collecting the judgment. Saratoga has failed to apply the correct standard of
law and demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion. Instead it argues 14-2-2(3)
requires more than failure to obtain a payment bond to award attorneys' fees. It asserts,
"[T]he Court must find something beyond mere liability . . . ." (Saratoga's Brief, pg. 19.)
Again, there is no support for this argument, which plainly contradicts that language of
the statute. There is nothing in that language which requires anything beyond failure to
provide a payment bond.
Saratoga also argues the equities do not favor an award of attorneys' fees.
Saratoga first argues it was not in privity with T.S.S. and, therefore, should not be
required to pay its fees. The issue of privity is immaterial. The Payment Bond Statutes
impose direct liability on owners for failure to obtain a payment bond, without regard to
privity. They require only that the subcontractor furnish equipment to the project and that
the equipment be used on the project. That is precisely what happened in this case.
Saratoga further argues T.S.S. should bear the risk because Saratoga did not
receive any ultimate benefit from the equipment T.S.S. supplied to the project. Saratoga's
reasoning is faulty and is one more example of its repeated attempts to avoid the natural

23

consequences of its failure to comply with its statutory obligations. Apparently, the work
performed by the subcontractor who used T.S.S.' equipment did not meet the owner's
contract requirements. That, however, is not T.S.S.' fault. There was never any assertion
or evidence that the work was not properly done because T.S.S.' equipment was faulty.
T.S.S. is not the insurer of those contractors to whom it rents equipment and should not
be forced to bear the burden of absorbing the costs of their allegedly defective work.
Saratoga, unlike T.S.S., had the ability and obligation to protect itself and others,
including T.S.S., by obtaining contractor performance and payment bond.
Had Saratoga furnished a payment bond, as it was statutorily required to do, T.S.S.
would have had rights against the bond, under § 14-2-1. Had T.S.S. prevailed on that
claim, as it did here, it would have been entitled to attorneys' fees, by statute. Utah Code
Ann. § 14-2-1(7). T.S.S. should not be penalized for Saratoga's failure to obtain the
required bond. Even in the absence of the payment bond, Saratoga could have eliminated
liability for fees by simply paying T.S.S. for the rental equipment used on the project. It
failed to do so. Once again, T.S.S. should not be punished for Saratoga's decision to
challenge its statutory obligations. As aptly stated by the Court in John Wagner, "He
[Saratoga] ha[d] his remedy in his own hands." John Wagner Associates v. Hercules,
Inc., 797 P.2d at 1125 (quoting Rio Grande, 167 P. at 244, 246 (1917)). Consequently,
Saratoga is the one who more appropriately bears the risk, which includes the costs and
fees necessary for T.S.S., the unpaid supplier, to enforce its rights.
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In its statement of issues at the beginning of its brief (pg. 2, III.), Saratoga states an
issue to be decided by the Court is whether the amount of fees the Court awarded T.S.S.
was unreasonable. It fails, however, to offer any argument in its brief that the amount of
fees awarded was anything but reasonable. Therefore, this issue should be summarily
decided in favor of T.S.S. Even if it had presented argument in its brief that the fees were
unreasonable, it did not object to the amount awarded below and, therefore, waived the
issue. In fact, at the hearing to determine the amount of fees, the trial judge specifically
asked counsel for Saratoga if he had any objection to the amount of fees requested. He
stated he did not.
Saratoga has failed to demonstrate that based on the above, the trial court abused
its discretion in awarding T.S.S. is attornevs' fees or that the amount of fees awarded was
unreasonable. The award of fees should, therefore, be affirmed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT T.S.S. WAS ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON ITS JUDGMENT
AGAINST SARATOGA AT THE CONTRACT RATE OF 18%.

Saratoga raises for the first time on appeal the argument that T.S.S. is not entitled
to interest at the contract rate of 18%. Nowhere below did it preserve this argument. In
fact, counsel for Saratoga approved the order awarding interest at the rate of 18%.
Consequently, it has waived this issue and cannot now assert it.
Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court already ruled in Oscar E. Chytrans Co., Inv.
v. Wasatch Furnace & Electric, Inc., 502 P.2d 554 (1972) that the Payment Bond Statutes
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peimit interest to be calculated at the underlying contract rate. That ruling, which the
trial court followed in this case, is consistent with the purpose of the Payment Bond
Statutes of "protecting] [] all persons supplying equipment. . ." in the amount of the
"reasonable value of the . . . equipment. . . furnished . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 &
14-2-2. The reasonable value of the equipment in this case includes the principal rental
amount as well as the 18% interest from the date the payment was due. Accordingly, the
trial court correctly ruled that T.S.S. was entitled to collect interest at that rate from
Saratoga and should be affirmed on that issue.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, T.S.S. respectfully requests that this Court affirm each
of the trial court's rulings.
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